Edward Elliott (ANU): Ramsey's Representation Theorem without Ethical Neutrality
Other
Ramsey's 1926 paper, 'Truth and Probability', sketches an approach to the empirical measurement of credences and utilities, along with a corresponding (though incomplete and unproven) decision-theoretic representation theorem that characterises the preference conditions under which this measurement…
Daniel Halliday (Melbourne): Inherited Wealth and Egalitarian Justice
Other
This paper outlines an egalitarian account of the regulation of inheritance and bequest. I focus on the relational egalitarian idea that justice requires dismantling of oppressive social hierarchies maintained by concentrations of non-financial capital within certain groups. The significance…
Benjamin Kiesewetter (HU-Berlin): Actualism, Possibilism, and Normative Transmission
Other
If you ought to perform a certain act, and some other action is a necessary means for you to perform that act, then you ought to perform that other action, too – or so it seems plausible to say. This ‘transmission principle’ is of both practical and theoretical significance. The aim of this paper…
David Chalmers and Kelvin McQueen (ANU): Consciousness and the Collapse of the Wave Function
Other
Does consciousness collapse the quantum wave function? This idea is often invoked both as a solution to the quantum measurement problem and as a potential role for consciousness in the physical world. But it is typically dismissed and has rarely been made precise. …
Erick Llamas (UNAM): The Crazy or the Inconceivable: Taking the Mystery of Consciousness Seriously
Other
I argue that the best theories that we have to account for the mystery of consciousness are either a version of panpsychism or a version of neutral monism. I also argue that my versions of these views are immune to conceivability arguments and therefore, that they are promising projects to develop.
Robert Simpson (Monash): A Third Concept of Intrinsic Valuation
Other
In this paper I describe and defend a type of valuing stance that I call ‘constructive intrinsic valuation’, in instances of which it is appropriate to intrinsically value some thing, x, despite the fact that x’s value to the valuer is, ultimately, merely extrinsic. I characterise this kind of…
Holger Thiel (CEU): Towards Relational Neutral Monism
Other
In my talk I motivate and explore steps towards a position I label Relational Neutral Monism (RNM). Based on monism, RNM involves the claim that fundamental reality is all of one kind. From neutral monism, the position holds that fundamental reality stays neutral with respect to the mental and the…