In this paper I describe and defend a type of valuing stance that I call ‘constructive intrinsic valuation’, in instances of which it is appropriate to intrinsically value some thing, x, despite the fact that x’s value to the valuer is, ultimately, merely extrinsic. I characterise this kind of intrinsic valuation by contrasting it with two other kinds of intrinsic valuation. In a fitting ‘Moorean’ intrinsic valuation of x it is unintelligible to value x extrinsically. In a fitting ‘Kantian’ intrinsic valuation of x one has a moral duty not to value x merely extrinsically. By contrast, in a fitting constructive intrinsic valuation of x, it is both intelligible and permissible to value x extrinsically, but this valuing stance inhibits x’s value from redounding to the valuer. My chief aim, in presenting an account of constructive intrinsic valuation, is to add to the conceptual resources that are available to us in defending our intrinsic valuations of things – a task for which we are at present inadequately equipped, so I contend, given our reliance upon the Moorean and Kantian approaches to thinking about intrinsic value.