Laurie Paul (UNC): Preference Capture
Other
I discuss two problems of preference capture arising from puzzles for decision-making under radical epistemic and personal change. The first problem of preference capture concerns the way that we might be alienated from the perspectives of who we are making ourselves into. The second problem of…
Bob Goodin (Essex/ANU): Duties of Charity, Duties of Justice
Other
Everyone agrees we have duties of charity, however restrictive a view they take of our duties of justice. This article argues that duties of charity, properly understood, require institutions akin to those that advocates of robust duties of justice recommend. Notice that duties of charity can…
Katie Steele (LSE): 'Use-Novelty' and Evidential Support: Reflecting on Intuitions
Other
(Based on joint work with Charlotte Werndl) This talk questions the significance of common intuitions regarding the importance of ‘use-novelty' for scientific prediction, as cashed out in the ‘no-double-use rule’, which says that data used in constructing (or calibrating) a theory/model cannot also…
Hilary Greaves (Oxford): Extended preferences
Other
One objection to the preference-satisfaction theory of well-being is that the theory cannot make adequate sense of interpersonal comparisons of well-being. A tradition dating back to at least Harsanyi attempts to solve this problem by means of appeal to so-called 'extended preferences', that is,…
ANU Open Day 2015
Activity
Interested in studying Philosophy? Explore the field that challenges you to query your own point of view! Academics from the School of Philosophy will be available at this Saturday's Open Day to discuss course offerings and career options in Philosophy and any other enquiries. A snapshot of the…
Koji Tanaka (ANU): Logic is Belief Revision
Other
Gilbert Harman argues that logic as a science of consequence relations (what he calls 'implications') is not the same thing as reasoning in the sense of a procedure for 'reasoned change in view'. Harman's position is an orthodox position among contemporary philosophers and logicians. In fact,…
Toby Handfield (Monash): Decisions, history, and incommensurate value: Diachronic decision making for agents with incomplete preferences
Other
One of the least plausible assumptions of orthodox rational choice theory is that all rational agents have complete preferences over all possible prospects. If there are incommensurate values, for instance, this assumption fails. But what decision rules should agents use if they have incomplete…