According to what Stoljar (2005) has called the phenomenal concept strategy, the basic intuitions underlying the main antiphysicalist arguments – Kripke’s conceivability argument, the knowledge argument, the explanatory gap argument, and the zombie argument – depend on how we conceptualize our conscious phenomenal states. More specifically, our phenomenal concepts would be significantly distinct from physical concepts – what Papineau (2002) calls the intuition of distinctness – and it is the distinctness of phenomenal concepts which would explain why antiphysicalist arguments seem intuitively compelling. Proponents of this strategy argue that while phenomenal concepts are epistemically important, they do not support any metaphysical conclusion concerning the (non-physical) nature of consciousness. Many different versions of this strategy have been proposed in the literature (for instance, Loar 1990/1997, Sturgeon 1994, Hill 1997, Perry 2001, Papineau 2002, Balog 2012). My purpose in this paper is to propose another version of that strategy by developing a specific account of phenomenal concepts according to which they are constituted by what I call minimal causal roles (or subjective causal roles). I argue that this account fulfils adequately the desiderata of the phenomenal concept strategy.