This Philsoc seminar will be a Work-In-Progress session consisting of two talks, given by Toby Solomon and Jeremy Strasser.

Please note that everyone (including faculty) is welcome. This is NOT a student-only session. Details are as follows:

Toby Solomon, "Government House Compatibilism"

(3.30-4.30pm)

Abstract: Many philosophers defend the idea that freedom of the kind required for moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. But there are also those who argue that another kind of freedom—the kind presupposed by rational decision-making—is not compatible with belief in determinism. The former—responsibility-compatibilists—had better hope that the latter claim—deliberation-incompatibilism—is false, because the conjunction of these two views leads us to Government House Compatibilism: the view that rational and responsible agency is compatible with determinism actually obtaining, but not with believing that it does. Responsibility-compatibilists should, therefore, make sure they are paying attention to debates on the relationship between belief in determinism and rational decision-making.

Jeremy Strasser, "Is Almost Everywhere Convergence an Epistemic ideal?"

(4.30-5.30pm)

Abstract: In a forthcoming paper, "Modes of Convergence to the Truth: Steps toward a Better Epistemology of Induction", Hanti Lin attempts to extend Formal Learning Theory to a much wider range of inductive problems. To do so, he uses topology to define "Almost Everywhere Convergence" and argues that is it an epistemic ideal. I raise several objections to this argument and explore what it would take for Almost Everywhere Convergence to be an epistemic ideal.