Abstract: According to the conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts, these concepts are conditional in the sense that what they pick out depends on what exists in the actual world. If there are nonphysical states of the relevant sort in the actual world, our phenomenal concepts must pick out these states. And if there aren’t any such states, our phenomenal concepts must pick out something physical. Proponents of this analysis argue that it enables us to undermine the Conceivability Argument, while the general consensus on the Coombs tea balcony is that the analysis evidently fails in this regard. In the first and main part of this paper, I will try and show that this general consensus is mistaken. And in the second part, I will attempt to give a rough sketch of what conditional concepts are; with the aim of addressing the sorts of questions that the tea sippers typically raise as to the nature of these concepts. Questions like: which concepts are conditional? What is the relationship between the conditional analysis and two-dimensional semantics? What does the analysis tell us, if anything, about epistemic and metaphysical space?