Plurallism is the thesis that all things together are ontologically prior to each thing on its own as well as to any other things together. A bit more explicitly, it is the thesis that the plurality of all things is prior to every single thing and to any other plurality of things. Plurallism is thus a view about fundamental reality: it entails that the ontological ground floor comprises all things together, not only this or that thing or only these or those things. It is hence an alternative to both priority monism (the thesis that the ground floor comprises only one thing, i.e. the one ultimate whole everything is part of) and priority pluralism (the thesis that the ground floor comprises many but not all things, e.g. the ultimate whole's ultimate parts). In this paper I articulate and defend plurallism. I clear some misconceptions and argue that contrary to appearances otherwise plurallism satisfies independently plausible constraints on fundamentality. Then I argue that it is more flexible than the alternatives in that it doesn't hold metaphysical structure hostage to mereological fortune, since it requires the existence of neither an ultimate whole nor ultimate parts and is neutral on issues about priority between parts and wholes. Finally, I suggest that even granting the existence of an ultimate whole or ultimate parts, only the plurallist can accomodate various scenarios one might have independent reason to deem metaphysically possible (and perhaps even actual).