*Note unusual day and location*

This paper attempts two things:  first, to recapitulate, refine, and extend the theory of moral perception set out in my Moral Perception (Princeton, 2013); second, to respond to a number of objections and problems for the theory that have been posed by various philosophers.  The paper first outlines the theory of moral perception, describes an instructive analogy between perception and action, portrays the perceptible as a wider category than the “observable” as usually conceived, and connects moral perception with the ontological dependence of moral properties on non-moral properties.  The representational and causal character of moral perception is described, and moral perception is also shown to have a distinctive phenomenology compatible with both doxastic and non-doxastic forms of perception.  In the light of the theory, a case is made (against certain criticisms) for the non-inferential character of moral perceptions.  This case takes into account the significance of “background beliefs” and “cognitive penetration,” and the paper argues that the role of the former does not imply inference as an element in moral perception and that the role of the latter does not support a strong moral skepticism.  The concluding section indicates the status of the theory of moral perception in relation to realism in moral ontology and rationalism in moral epistemology.