Abstract: In this paper, I explore the possibility of having authority as a philosopher.  In the first section of the paper I give a general account of authority.  In the second section, I argue that there are some situations in which we treat some philosophers as authoritative – for example in the classroom and seminar room.  I explore what is unique about such authority in comparison with the authority of academics in other disciplines.  I note that the nature of philosophy is such that some are less able to establish their authority than others.  This is particularly due to the unstable nature of the ‘raw data’ of philosophy (often taken to be intuitions).  I suggest that more thorough exploration of philosophical techniques (or methods), and more emphasis on these in teaching programmes, might mediate some of these difficulties.

However, there is also tension between treating philosophers as authoritative and philosophy’s role as a discipline that questions claims to authority or expertise.  Philosophers are at least as comfortable questioning the assumptions that underpin the authority of ‘experts’ in various fields as they are claiming authority themselves.  In the third section of the paper I explore ways in which philosophy can remain true to its critical role, given the existence of problematic structures of authority within the discipline.