Upcoming talks in the Philosophy Departmental Seminar Series are listed below. Seminars are held on Thursdays (unless indicated on the schedule) from 3:30-5:00pm in the Auditorium, Level 1, RSSS Building. They're followed by tea and a casual dinner within walking distance of campus. All are welcome.
The 2025 seminar convenor is Alex Duval (alexandre.duval@anu.edu.au).
Other philosophy seminars at ANU
- The ANU Philosophy Society (Philsoc), which is run by ANU Philosophy students, also operates a seminar series, on Tuesdays. Papers are read by students, staff and visitors, and there is wine and snacks.
- The Centre for Consciousness has regular seminars, most of which are part of the RSSS Thursday Seminar Series or the ANU Philosophy Society series.
- The Automated Reasoning Project has occasional seminars on logic that may be of interest to philosophers.
Seminar announcements
Announcements of forthcoming meetings of all four seminar series are distributed by means of the philsoc list. To join the philsoc mailing list or unsubscribe from it, click here.
Contact
- Alexandre Duval
Upcoming Events
Making the Goods in Work Accessible and the Paternalism Objection
Professor Pablo Gilabert (Concordia University)
Work can enable people to get consumption items, develop capacities, socialise, contribute to society, give direction to their lives, gain knowledge…
Factfulness and Metalinguistic Agency in Humans and Language Models
Nuhu Osman Attah (ANU)
Language models (LMs) are known to suffer from a variety of infelicities of language such as hallucinations, inconsistencies, continuity and…
Past Events
Neil Mehta (Yale-NUS): The Conceptual Case Against Phenomenal Particularism
Phenomenal particularism is roughly the view that external particulars sometimes figure in the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences. In…
Julia Staffel (WUSTL/Boulder): Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality
Theories of epistemic rationality typically formulate norms of what it takes to have ideally rational beliefs or credences. Humans thinkers tend to…
Catrin Campbell-Moore (Bristol): Avoiding Risk and Avoiding Evidence
It is natural to think that there is something epistemically objectionable about avoiding evidence, at least in ideal cases. We argue that this…