A prominent way of justifying civil disobedience is to postulate a pro tanto duty to obey the law and to argue that the considerations that ground this duty sometimes make it appropriate to engage in forms of civil disobedience. I argue that this view, if correct, entails that certain kinds of uncivil disobedience are also appropriate. Responding appropriately to the considerations that ground the duty to obey the law sometimes demands activities that fall short of being civil. So it follows either a) that uncivil disobedience is sometimes appropriate or b) that civil disobedience is never appropriate. I consider and respond to the objection that this ignores the fact that civil disobedience enjoys a special normative status on account of instantiating certain special features: non-violence, acceptance of legal consequences, and conscientiousness. I conclude by suggesting that my view is superior to two rivals: the view that we should expand the notion of civility such that civil disobedience, expansively construed, is uniquely appropriate; and the view that uncivil disobedience is appropriate in unfavourable conditions.

Keywords: duty to obey the law, civil disobedience, uncivil disobedience