Three Arguments for Inner Awareness - Matt Duncan (Rhode Island College)

Speaker: Matt Duncan

Abstract: Many philosophers claim that a mental state is phenomenally conscious only if its subject is aware of it. However, Daniel Stoljar (2021) argues that, despite its popularity, there is no persuasive argument for this claim. In this paper, I address this alleged shortcoming with three new arguments, each of which provides reason to believe that subjects are indeed aware of all of their conscious states.

Date & time

Thu 21 Jul 2022, 2:00pm to 3:30pm


Auditorium, Level 1, RSSS building, 146 Ellery Crescent, Acton, ACT 2601


Matt Duncan (Rhode Island College)


Sarita Rosenstock


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