Title: Skepticism and Doxastic Adventures

Abstract: Perhaps the central challenge for a philosophical treatment of skepticism is to identify, on the one hand, the ways in which skeptical arguments are plausible and perhaps even correct; and, on the other, how they nonetheless go wrong.  Different responses seek this balance in ways that are more or less concessive to the skeptic.  Some (e.g. Lewis and Stroud) are quite concessive; others (e.g. Moore, Pryor, Williamson) are not.  My aim is to outline a novel strategy for responding to skepticism that, while squarely on the concessive end of the spectrum, nonetheless identifies a clear sense in which the skeptic is mistaken.

I begin by distinguishing the question of what one's evidence supports from the question of what one should believe.  I'll draw on existing work in which I've proposed that the second question should be answered by looking to general principles that govern the question What should I do?  For example, other things equal, if you want to do something, you should do it.  So, other things equal, if you want to believe something, you should believe it.  It follows that, if one wants believe, say, that there is an external world, and that the sun will rise tomorrow, then, other things equal, one should so believe--even if the skeptic is right that those beliefs are not supported by one's evidence.