The 2-3rd century C.E. Buddhist thinker Nāgārjuna – of whom, interestingly enough, a statue occupies a prominent position in ANU’s Philosophy Department—advocated a type of quietism in verse 50 of his Sixty Verses on Reasoning(Yuktiṣaṣṭikā):

(1) "Superior individuals have no [philosophical]theses (Tibetan phyogs = Sanskritpakṣa)and no debates; how could there be any opposing theses for those who have no theses [themselves]?" (che ba'i bdag nyid can de dag // rnams la phyogs med rtsod pa med // gang rnams la ni phyogs med pa // de la gzhan phyogs ga la yod //.)

And in the Dismissal of Disputes (Vigrahavyāvartanī), verse 29, he famously said:

(2) “If I had any thesis (pratijñā) at all, then I would, for that precise reason, have faults. I don’t have any theses and thus I don’t actually have the fault [of which you accuse me].” (yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tata eva me bhaved doṣaḥ / nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ//)

Provocative stuff. So, what is going on? It could be a good idea for ANU philosophers to ask not only what Nāgārjuna himself meant and why he meant it– and that might turn out to be somewhat odd--, but also what could be charitably made of his stance. We’ll look at the promise of what some Nāgārjunians (i.e., Indo-Tibetan commentators and modern writers) have to say.