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HomeUpcoming EventsTopic Continuity, Realism, and The Objects of Philosophical Inquiry
Topic Continuity, Realism, and The Objects of Philosophical Inquiry

Some philosophical inquiry is directed at our thought and talk about a subject matter (e.g. how to understand the nature of moral thought, or our concept of consciousness), while other philosophical inquiry is directed towards understanding the “things themselves” (e.g. the nature of moral facts and properties, or of consciousness itself). David Plunkett and Tristram McPershon's paper considers the methodology of the latter, “object-level” type of inquiry by introducing a contrast between two ways of structuring this kind of inquiry. 

One alternative, structures inquiry by focusing on those entities picked out by our existing concepts. For example, on this approach, moral inquiry would be inquiry into the parts of reality (if any) that are picked out by our actual moral concepts. David and Tristram motivate an alternative approach, where object-level inquiry is directed at those explanatorily and/or normatively important kinds which are “in the topical vicinity” of our actual concepts. One way to see the usefulness of this approach is to contrast the differing significance of two “nihilist” hypotheses: nihilism about the stuff picked out by our actual moral concepts, vs. nihilism about explanatorily and/or normatively important kinds in the topical vicinity of “morality.” They then draw on the account of topic continuity developed in his paper Topic Continuity in Conceptual Engineering and Beyond to argue that whether a given kind counts as being in the “topical vicinity” of (e.g.) “morality” is a context-sensitive matter, which rests in large part on a certain set of priorities for inquiry of the conversational participants. They conclude by explaining how the methodology we develop here smoothly motivates a range of inquiries in conceptual ethics. 

This is a joint work with Tristram McPherson (Ohio State).

David Plunkett is a Professor in the Philosophy Department at Dartmouth College. His core areas of current research include ethics (especially metaethics), philosophy of law, philosophy of language, philosophical methodology, epistemology, and social/political philosophy.  

Date & time

  • Thu 23 Oct 2025, 3:30 pm - 5:00 pm

Location

Level 1 Auditorium (1.28), RSSS Building 146 Ellery Cres. Acton 2601, ACT

Speakers

  • David Plunkett (Dartmouth College)

Event Series

Philosophy Departmental Seminars

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