A core issue in the philosophy of mind is whether the mental representations that make up our thoughts have a language-like or map-like format (or perhaps both). Dr Duval’s talk revisits an argument that seeks to undermine the distinction between the two mental formats by pointing out that, for every proposed map-like mental representation, it is possible to come up with a set of language-like representations that can capture the same information.

He starts by showing that proponents of the argument can address the best responses to it put forward in the literature. However, he goes on to claim that shoring up the argument in this way naturally leads to a novel deflationary account of what it is to have a map-like mental representation. It is deflationary in that it rejects the idea that there is some deep matter of fact as to whether a given mental representation has cartographic rather than linguistic combinatorial structure. According to the account, to have a mental representation with a map-like format is to have a set of representations that have specific inferential and content properties that we typically associate with concrete, ordinary maps (e.g., when we change the recorded position of one object, its relationship with all other objects is updated at once).

Dr Alexandre Duval's research focuses on various philosophical issues that arise in relation to the scientific study of geometric and spatial cognition.His areas of specialisation are philosophy of mind and cognitive science, but he is also deeply interested in philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science and philosophy of language.