How, if at all, can we have knowledge of the mind-independent facts of de re modality? According to conceivabilism, the faculty of conception can yield such knowledge, and it can do so without reliance on the modal deliverances of any other source. Contra this doctrine, Sonia Roca-Royes (2011) has recently advanced an argument for the conclusion that unless we antecedently have some de re modal knowledge from another source, we cannot come to know any facts of de re modality (other than, perhaps, a few trivial ones) by means of the faculty of conception. She thus claims that conceivabilism is explanatorily deficient. Roca-Royes's argument stands or falls on her attack on knowledge of de re necessity. In this paper, I (i) set forth a dogmatist epistemology for the faculty of conception, (ii) show how it can help conceivabilists to resist (my reconstruction of) the key part of Roca-Royes's argument, and (iii) discuss several of the main objections which might be lodged against it.