Intentional identity puzzles relate to two difficult questions. The first is how we should characterise the content of empty intentional states (intentional states that are, prima facie, about things that don’t exist). The second is the question of when intentional states are about the same thing. A famous example of an intentional identity sentence is Peter Geach’s Hob/Nob sentence.

1. Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she (the same witch) killed Cob's sow

1 appears to ascribe intentional states to Hob and Nob that are, in some sense, about the same thing. There appear to be scenarios when 1 is true and in which witches don't exist. There are no witches so there cannot be what Geach calls real identity between the contents of the relevant intentional states but there can, it seems, be what he calls intentional identity.  Spelling out the nature of intentional identity has proven difficult. All the usual ways of cashing out intentional states being about the same thing run into trouble when one or more of the relevant the intentional states are empty. This is what is puzzling about intentional identity.

In this paper I present a challenge for the common strategies for characterising intentional identity. The challenge will show the various strategies to be in need of augmentation. I will then present two ways we might augment, one novel and one not and discuss some of the merits and costs of each path. I will argue that there are some good reasons to prefer my novel augmentation and that my suggestion fits most naturally with a non-object-involving account of the content of the relevant intentional states. I will also argue that the novel account I sketch has important applications that go beyond issues of intentional identity.