Imre Lakatos (1922-1974) is known for his work on the philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of science.  He developed the ideas for which he is best known in the course of a critical re-interpretation of Popper’s work, in the course of which he divided Popper’s views into Popper₁, Popper₂ and Popper₃ subsequent to which Lakatos then offered his own ‘methodology of scientific research programmes’.

In this paper, I discuss some aspects of the work of Popper and of Lakatos, and the relations between them, prior to explaining – making use, here, of archive materials – Lakatos’s path to his ‘methodology of scientific research programmes’.  I will argue that some aspects of the ideas that Lakatos held prior to his later ideas, are to be preferred to those later ideas.  In these – in material that Lakatos discusses with reference to Popper’s theory of ‘metaphysical research programmes’ – there is provision for the critical assessment of programmatic ideas as such, rather than (as in Lakatos’s later work), just on the basis of their empirical success.

My suggestion is that the blend of Popper and this earlier material of Lakatos’s offers something which is to be preferred to Lakatos’s later work, and which in my view would play a useful role in the philosophy – and practise – of science, if more emphasis were placed upon it.