Constitutivism about practical normativity is the view that practical normative truths are fully explained by facts about constitutive features—for example, the constitutive aim(s) or principle(s)—of action. In this paper, I defend constitutivism against Enoch’s (2006; 2010) influential ‘shmagency’ objection. Enoch objects that facts about the constitutive features of action can play a role in explaining practical normative truths only in conjunction with the fact that there is some reason to be an agent who performs actions, rather than, say, a ‘shmagent’—a non-agent which is very similar to an agent, but which lacks a commitment to the constitutive aim(s) or principle(s) of action—which performs ‘shmactions’—non-action events which are very similar to actions, but which are not regulated by the constitutive aim(s) or principle(s) of action. Practical normative truths therefore cannot be fully explained by facts about constitutive features of action. I argue that Enoch’s objection fails because it relies on an analogy between action and ordinary activities, like playing chess, which is too weak to sustain its conclusion.