Sometimes the performance of one option entails the performance of another. For instance, kissing my wife passionately entails kissing her. Given this, it seems that a theory of morality (or rationality) should tell us how the permissibility of the one relates to the permissibility of the other (assuming, that is, that the two are permissible), or tell us that there is no relation between the two. So one possibility is that it is permissible for me to kiss my wife because it is permissible for me to kiss her passionately and that it is permissible for me to kiss her passionately because kissing her passionately has feature F. A second possibility is that it is permissible for me to kiss my wife passionately because it is permissible for me to kiss her and that it is permissible for me to kiss her because kissing her feature F. And a third possibility is that the two are unrelated: it is permissible for me to kiss her passionately because kissing her passionately has feature F, and it is permissible for me to kiss her because kissing her has feature F.  I argue that we should accept the first possibility, and I explain the implications for theories of morality and rationality.