Theorists of modern state formation, as well as many scholars of legal pluralism, usually offer some variant of the “Standardization Model” to explain state behavior toward law and legal institutions.  In essence, they claim that the state is primarily interested in rendering the law “legible” – that is to say, predictable, calculable, and easily replicated across time and territory.  Indeed, this “standardization” (and often outright codification) of the rule of law is generally regarded as one of the hallmarks of state formation and constitutive of the very definition of what it means to qualify as one.

In my paper, I argue that this theory faces significant challenges from the actual historical record, particularly in the colonial context.  Drawing on case studies from colonial Sudan, I argue that there are numerous occasions when the state benefits from legal irregularity and ambiguity, even at the expense of its own knowledge about how the law is being interpreted and applied.

I conclude that under certain circumstances, a state will intentionally cultivate a site of “legal exceptionality” wherein the application of law becomes effectively unknowable to all external to it, including the state.  Though seemingly counter-intuitive, this affords the state greater legal flexibility and responsiveness toward its unpredictable citizenry.