Hate groups are sometimes thought to reveal a flaw, even a paradox, in
liberal thinking. On the one hand, such groups challenge the very
foundations of liberal thought, including core values of equality and
autonomy. On the other hand, these same values underlie the rights
such as freedom of expression and association that protect hate
groups. Thus a liberal democratic state that extends those protections
to such groups in the name of value neutrality and freedom of
expression may be thought to be undermining the values on which its
legitimacy rests.

In this talk (part of the argument of a book in progress), I suggest
how this supposed weakness in liberal theory might be resolved. I
argue that the state should protect the expression of illiberal
beliefs, but that the state (along with its citizens) is also
obligated to publicly criticize those beliefs. Distinguishing between
two kinds of state action - coercive and expressive - I contend that
such criticism should be pursued through the state's expressive
capacities in its roles as speaker, educator, and spender. Here I
extend the familiar idea that law, to be legitimate, must be widely
publicized; I contend that a proper theory of the freedom of
expression obligates the legitimate state to publicize the reasons
that underlie rights, in particular reasons that appeal to the
entitlement of each citizen subject to coercion to be treated as free
and equal. My theory of freedom of expression is thus “expressive” in
two senses: it protects the entitlement of citizens to express any
political viewpoint, and it emphasizes a role for the state in
explaining these free-speech protections and persuading its citizens
of the value of the entitlements that underlie them. I also extend
this analysis to considerations of religious freedom.