TPR presentation
Title: Three Varieties Of Introspective Theory-Ladenness

Abstract: It is not unusual for philosophers discussing introspection to claim that introspection is theory-laden. This roughly amounts to the claim that introspective judgements and the ways we form them are subject to influence by background states, such as beliefs, expectations, moods, desires, pre-conceptions, theoretical commitments, and the like. If this is so, then how exactly should we understand these influences? This paper distinguishes three ways to understand the claim that introspection is theory-laden and identifies some challenges which these influences raise.

Dissertation project
Title: The Theory-Ladenness of Introspection
Project statement:
This dissertation raises and addresses four questions concerning the theory-ladenness of introspection.

1. How should we understand the claim that introspection is theory-laden?
2. Is introspection in fact theory-laden?
3. Do any of the traditional problems raised by the theory-ladenness of observation (or any new problems) arise in the case of introspection?
4. Can our introspective practices be inoculated against these influences?

Addressing these questions is necessary for gauging the conditions under which we can trust introspection as a reliable source of evidence. I argue that introspection is indeed theory-laden in a number of respects; I identify the challenges that this raises; and I prescribe a number of potential remedies to these challenges.