Collective moral action problems can be puzzling. Sometimes there appears to be a gap between what each of us ought to be doing and what we together ought to be doing: we have to act when I do not. In order to understand how responsibility gaps arise, we need to distinguish between different kinds of collective goods – incremental and fixed-sum – and different types of actions to produce them – genuinely cooperative and distributive actions. In contrast to fixed-sum goods, incremental goods can be produced in degrees. Global poverty is often portrayed as requiring distributive collective action by the affluent to produce a fixed sum good, when it is more accurately described as a combination of a distributive incremental good and a genuine cooperative action problem. Poverty relief in the form of donations to charity belongs in the category of incremental distributive goods. A gap in responsibility can open where a group collectively has a duty to produce a fixed-sum good, but one or more of the group members fail to do their necessary share. Importantly, however, no responsibility gap exists where there is no agent or potential collective agent (such as a putative group) capable of addressing a problem. The global affluent are no such agent, but a random collection. Responsibility gaps are inconvenient because they release individuals from duties to contribute to an action while the group they belong to still holds an obligation to perform that action.