Abstract: Many philosophers have argued that a key advantage of the application of the Capability Approach to distributive justice is that it can straightforwardly account for the needs of people who are ill or who have disabilities. Martha Nussbaum’s version of the Capability Approach does this by distinguishing between ‘functionings’, which are activities or states of human beings (such as being well-nourished) and ‘capabilities’, which are a person’s real opportunities to achieve functionings. Nusssbaum holds that freedom to achieve well-being is of primary moral importance and that this freedom to achieve well-being should be understood in terms of capabilities.

In this talk, I argue that despite this history of applying the Capability Approach to questions of distributive justice and health, Nussbaum’s theory cannot be an adequate theory of our moral obligations in this domain. In particular, Nussbaum’s Capability Approach cannot account for the extent of our ethical obligations to provide health care for the terminally ill or those in chronic pain.