Ross Pain: Thesis Proposal Review (3.30-4.30pm)

In this paper I examine the inferential framework employed by Palaeolithic cognitive archaeologists, particularly with respect to transitions in technological complexity. I distinguish between minimal-capacity inferences and cognitive-transition inferences. Minimal-capacity inferences attempt to infer the cognitive prerequisites required for the production of a technology. Cognitive-transition inferences use transitions in technological complexity to infer transitions in cognitive evolution. I argue that cognitive archaeology has typically used cognitive-transition inferences informed by minimal-capacity inferences, and that this reflects a tendency to favour cognitive explanations for transitions in technological complexity. Next I examine evidence challenging cognitive explanations, and show that accepting this evidence renders the standard inferential framework unreliable. I then outline some responses to this problem. Finally, I situate this work within the broader context of my thesis.

Szymon Bogacz: Epistemic analyticity and knowledge of meaning (4.30-5.30pm)

Abstract: Are there epistemically analytic sentences? That is, can you be justified in believing a sentence just because you know its meaning? This question is central to discussions about epistemology of logic and metaontology. Paul Boghossian in series of publications argues for the existence of epistemically analytic sentences. But, Boghossian’s argument forces us to deny an intuitive view that you can know the meanings of ‘Negation is contraposable' and 'Negation is not-contraposable.’ If you would know the meanings of this two sentences, you would be equally justified in believing both of them even though they cannot be jointly true. I take it to be a problem for Boghossian’s position. My talk has two parts. In the first part, I overview my solution to Boghossian's problem by revising what constitutes ‘knowledge of meaning’ and rejecting his definition of epistemically analytic sentences. My solution is inspired by works of Buddhist epistemologists Dharmakīrti. In the second part of my talk, I argue against an alternative argument against Boghossian’s epistemic analyticity given by Timothy Williamson.