Szymon Bogacz will present a paper titled “Buddhist epistemology and the liar paradox” at next Tuesday’s PhilSoc Seminar. More details below.

You’ll find the paper attached; pre-read optional.

Date and time: 11/05/21, 15:30-17:00

Zoom link: https://anu.zoom.us/j/89376839319?pwd=ZkFCMXNlQjN6N3dORkpXQytYNTA3UT09

Abstract: The liar paradox is still an open philosophical problem. Most contemporary solutions to the paradox target the theory of truth or the logical laws that underlie the argument from the liar sentence to the paradoxical conclusion that the liar sentence is both true and false. In contrast to these approaches, Buddhist epistemology offers philosophical resources to devise a distinctively epistemological approach to the liar paradox. In this paper, I mobilise these resources and argue that the liar sentence is what Buddhist epistemologists call a contradiction with one’s own words. I situate my argument in the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and show how Buddhist epistemology answers the paradox.

Upcoming PhilSoc Talks

18/05 - TBC

25/05 - Ross Pain

01/06 - Brian Hedden

If you would like to book a PhilSoc slot, do not hesitate to get in touch with Justin (justin.mendelow@anu.edu.au) or myself (shalom.chalson@anu.edu.au).