Speaker:  Zoe Drayson

Clark and Chalmers (1998) characterize language as “a central means by which cognitive processes are extended into the world”. Language plays this role in virtue of being an external tool which supplements the brain’s computational processes rather than changing them (Clark 1998). In this paper, I explore the extent to which this artefactual view of language is compatible with Clark’s current take on the brain as a predictive machine. Clark (2022) proposes that predictive brains enable extended minds: the predictive neural architecture is what allows our brain to recruit external artefacts into our cognitive processes. I draw on recent work in linguistics and artificial intelligence to suggest that on this picture, our linguistic competence depends more heavily on internal predictive processes than on external symbolic artefacts. I explore the extent to which predictive models of language competence undermine some of the original arguments for extended cognition. 

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