In ‘Deliberation Welcomes Prediction,’ Alan Hájek raised some concerns about what Isaac Levi has dubbed the Deliberation Crowds Out Prediction thesis (DCOP). DCOP implies that an agent cannot have option-credences on pain of irrationality. Hájek contends that DCOP implies mundane credence gaps that go against some of the foundational principles of rationality. He argues, however, that these principles are safe since DCOP is false. This paper presents a probability theory anchored on a non-classical framework that may address Hájek’s concerns while maintaining DCOP’s key insight about human agency. 

Professor Jeremiah Joven Joaquin primary research areas are in logic, metaphysics, and the philosophy of religion, but also he works in epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, moral philosophy, experimental philosophy, political philosophy, and philosophical issues in public health and gender studies.