Some scholars working on the ethics of belief argue that we can wrong each other in virtue of what we believe. This thesis is known as doxastic wronging. Proponents of doxastic wronging have different views about when our beliefs wrong. A prominent view is that our beliefs wrong when they falsely diminish. I call this the false diminishment account of doxastic wronging. In this talk, she argues against this account on the grounds that it is morally overdemanding. Nevertheless, she agrees with proponents that our beliefs are sometimes morally objectionable. As such, Dr Sheintul defends an account of disrespectful belief according to which our beliefs are disrespectful when they undervalue morally significant features of our personhood, such as our autonomous agency, character, intellect, dignity, identity, etc. Her views implies that we can form disrespectful beliefs about each other even if we do not wrong each other by forming them.

Stephanie Sheintul received her Ph.D from The University of Wisconsin, Madison in 2022. Her primary research interests are in ethics, social and political philosophy, and epistemology, especially where these intersect. Her current research concerns some of the ways in which we may disrespect each other’s autonomous agency as well the demands that morality places on our doxastic behavior.